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Disappearing Acts – Toward a Global Civil Liability Regime for Pollution Damage 




Civil liability for pollution damage is recognized and firmly established under 
international law. However, there is no global international treaty that addresses this 
issue with respect to offshore oil and gas exploration. This may be due partly to the 
infrequency of the occurrence of offshore oil well blowouts. However, offshore 
operations represent a constant threat to the marine environment since the risk of a 
blowout leading to an ecological disaster is ever present. The trend has been the 
adoption of regional agreements to tackle the issue. However, most of the regional 
arrangements deal with the issue in a sidelong manner and they lack worldwide 
application. The case is made that a global treaty on the subject is long overdue.  
 
 LL.B. (University of Ghana), LL.M. (Dalhousie Law School), LL.M. Candidate (Cornell Law School).  
Dedicated to Phinna Agoe-Sowah – simply inspirational! 
 
Introduction  
Covering 72 per cent of the earth’s total surface area and with a total volume of 140 
million square kilometers,1 the oceans represent a vast resource for the sustenance of 
humankind. The sea is a channel of trade and commerce, a source of hydrocarbons from 
which we get the most coveted source of energy – oil. For slightly over a century now 
petroleum products have been the answer to the energy requirements of the world. 
Though it began later than onshore oil exploration, offshore oil and gas exploration is 
today as prevalent as the former and it is said to represent nearly a third of the world’s 
hydrocarbon liquid production.2
The use of the oceans by the oil industry for production and transportation of petroleum 
products present grave environmental challenges owing to the risk of pollution from oil 
spills. The environmental carnage in the marine environment resulting from oil spills 
from the Torrey Canyon (1967), Argo Merchant (1976), Amoco Cadiz (1978), Exxon 
Valdez (1989), and the Sea Empress (1996), makes a strong case for the adoption of 
effective pollution prevention measures. 
 
At present, there exist countless international agreements dealing with marine pollution 
prevention. Yet “[w]hile the primary aim of the international law relating to marine 
 
1 Oceans and Law of the Sea, online: United Nations: Division for Oceans Affairs and the Law of the Sea 
<http://www.un.org/Depts/los/index.htm>
2 HOSSEIN ESMAELI, THE LEGAL REGIME OF OFFSHORE OIL RIGS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
12 (Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing Co., 2001)[ESMAEILI, OFFSHORE OIL RIGS].  
pollution should be to prevent such pollution, a subsidiary aim should be to facilitate the 
bringing of compensation claims by those who have suffered damage where pollution has 
occurred.”3 The ex post facto concerns are equally as important as the ex ante 
considerations. 
 
The shipping industry, for instance, has been the subject of global international 
agreements that address the issue of civil liability for damage arising from oil spills from 
ships. There is, however, a distinct lack of a comprehensive and binding global 
instrument that addresses this subject in relation to offshore oil and gas exploration.  
Several rules are scattered in various international agreements but there is no uniformity 
and definitiveness in their tenor. Even where these factors are present, the rules lack 
worldwide application. 
 
One reason which probably accounts for this state of affairs is the fact that there are very 
few cases of oil rig blowout incidents at sea compared to tanker accidents,4 and the 
“chances of a technical blow-out are known to be remote, thanks to the technological 
achievements of recent years.”5 However, the “chance of a catastrophic blowout always 
exist”6 because offshore operations present a constant risk of environmental pollution.7
Whatever the case may be, the risk of a tanker spill and a well blowout is the “same since 
 
3 R.R. CHURCHILL AND A.V. LOWE, THE LAW OF THE SEA 358 (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 1999)[CHURCHILL AND LOWE, THE LAW OF THE SEA]. 
4 Bernard A. Dubais, The 1976 London Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage from 
Offshore Operations, 9 J. MAR. L. & COM. 61 (1997)[Dubais, The 1976 London Convention]. 
5 Ibid. at 65. 
6 ESMAEILI, OFFSHORE OIL RIGS, supra note 2 at 146. 
7 John Warren Kindt, The Law of the Sea: Offshore Installations and Marine Pollution, 12 PEPP. L. REV. 
381 (1985). Indeed, oil rig blow-outs at sea are not unknown. About 35 catastrophic blow-outs occurred 
between 1955-1981 – see DOUGLAS BRUBAKER, MARINE POLLUTION AND INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 38-40 (London and Florida: Belhaven Press, 1993).  
[they result] from the action of the same polluting material (oil) introduced into the same 
natural environment (the sea).”8
A second probable reason for the lack of a concrete global instrument on the subject is 
the fact that offshore operations mostly take place on the continental shelf and therefore 
fall under the direct jurisdiction of individual states under the maritime zones regime of 
the Law of the Sea Convention.9 National laws therefore, regulate such operations. The 
trend since the 1970s has been the adoption of several regional conventions which 
attempt to deal with the subject because as one author observes, 
…great geographical differences between various regions make efforts 
towards global cooperation both extremely complicated and unnecessary. 
As the presence of oil rigs and assorted platforms seems to be most 
evident in coastal waters the pollution problems they cause are better 
tackled by regional agreements that take into account the different 
conditions of any particular area.10 
Yet it is intriguing that the “great geographical differences” did not prevent or make it 
unnecessary to adopt the LOSC to regulate the entirety of the oceans. Whatever be the 
virtue in piecemeal regulation in this area, it is this writer’s conviction that there is an 
urgent need for the harmonization of international law rules with the aim of establishing a 
binding and uniform civil liability regime with global reach for pollution damage 
resulting from offshore operations. This will engender predictability of the limits of 
liability. 
 
8 Bernard A. Dubais, Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage Resulting from Exploration and Exploitation 
of Hydrocarbons in the Seabed, 6 J. MAR. L. & COM. 549, 553 (1975) [Dubais, Compensation]. 
9 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, (10 December 1982), 1883 U.N.T.S. 397 [Hereafter 
referred to as LOSC]. 
10 MARIA GAVOUNELI, POLLUTION FROM OFFSHORE INSTALLATIONS 
(London/Dordrecht/Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers Group, 1995) 39 [GAVOUNELI, POLLUTION]. 
It is prudent also to stress that despite the division of the sea into regions, the various 
segments possess physical and geomorphologic unity. The oceans do not exist mutually 
exclusive of each other. The sea is one big collection of water with the exception of the 
so-called closed seas. The divisions are imaginary and they find their explanation in 
convenience. Pollution in one area will seep into the other regardless of our imaginary 
boundaries.  
 
Transboundary pollution may erode any efforts at regulation in the area which suffers the 
damage. “In other words, the resources of the [sea] constitute one proprietary unity in a 
physical sense”11 and “[i]n spite of the common but highly deceptive practice of dividing 
the world ocean into a discreet set of “seven seas”… all the world’s seas are in reality 
part of a single interconnected world ocean…”12 The high seas and other areas beyond 
the limits of national jurisdiction become even more vulnerable to the deleterious effects 
of pollution in the absence of a global instrument on civil liability. 
 
This paper examines the present state of the civil liability and compensation regime under 
international law for pollution damage resulting from offshore exploration for oil and gas. 
The case is made that the scattered international law rules regulating this area should be 
harmonized into a single and binding international convention with global reach. The 
interests of both the industry and claimants will be better served when the rules are 
defined, identifiable, concrete, determinative and binding.  
 
11 David Dzidzornu, Marine Pollution Control: The Evolving International Law, 2 AUSTRALASIAN J. 
OF  NATURAL RESOURCES L. & POL’Y 111, 122 (1995) [original emphasis]. 
12 Charles E. Pirtle, Military Uses of Ocean Space and the Law of the Sea in the New Millennium, 31 
OCEAN DEVEL. & INT’L L. 7, 21 (2000). 
This paper is divided into five parts. Part I takes a brief look at the impact of oil spills and 
other polluting substances relating to offshore operations on the marine environment. Part 
II is an analysis of the customary international law position on civil liability for marine 
pollution. Part III examines the international treaty law on the subject. Part IV is an 
excursion through existing regional arrangements that attempt to deal with the subject, 
especially under the UNEP Regional Seas Programme.13 Part V is an attempt to 
assimilate civil liability rules in the shipping industry to offshore operations.  
 
Part I – Oil and Other Matter in the Ocean 
Though “it is easier in the case of offshore exploration to take necessary precautions to 
avoid an accident or to limit its effects even before undertaking the drilling of a well”,14 
in reality offshore exploration exerts a heavy pollution toll on the marine environment. 
Article 1(4) of the LOSC defines pollution as: 
the introduction by man, directly or indirectly, of substances or energy 
into the marine environment, including estuaries, which results or is likely 
to result in such deleterious effects as harm to living resources and marine 
life, hazards to human health, hindrance to marine activities, including 
fishing and other legitimate uses of the sea, impairment of quality for use 
of sea water and reduction of amenities. 
 
From seismic survey, to exploration and appraisal, through development and production 
to abandonment of rigs and wells, the industry introduces pollutants into the marine 
 
13 The UNEP Regional Seas Programme is made up of more than 140 coastal states participating in 13 
regional programmes designed to address the accelerating degradation of the world’s oceans and coastal 
areas – Regional Seas Programme, online: United Nations Environment Programme 
<http://www.unep.ch/regionalseas/home/over.htm>
14 Dubais, Compensation, supra note 8 at 551. 
environment.15 Pollution from offshore operations may be deliberate or accidental.16 It 
may result from “blow-outs (i.e. the escape of oil or gas resulting from the loss of control 
over the flow from a well); rupture of a pipeline; a collision between a ship and an 
installation; an accident while a tanker is being loaded from an installation; or destruction 
of a suspended well-head or sub-sea completion system”;17 operational discharges; and 
the dumping of oil rigs at sea. 
 
It is said that “oil remains the main marine pollution problem [especially] due to the fact 
that human ingenuity has not so far perfected any reasonable method of removing oil 
from water.”18 Oil in the marine environment exerts negative biological (lethal, sub-
lethal, physical smothering, and tainting of sea foods) effects and adverse ecological 
impact on the shorelines, open waters, the seabed, wetlands, corals, fisheries and coastal 
amenities.19 
It is also maintained that the deleterious effects of operational discharges are minimal.20 
Nevertheless, the major emission – produced water – “does have a higher salinity and 
temperature [than seawater] which can modify the species composition in the vicinity of 
the outfall.”21 
15 Zhiguo Gao, Environmental Regulation of Oil and Gas in the Twentieth Century and Beyond: An 
Introduction and Overview in ZHIGUO GAO, ED., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION OF OIL AND 
GAS 3, 5 (London: Kluwer Law International Ltd., 1998). 
16 CHURCHILL AND LOWE, THE LAW OF THE SEA, supra note 3 at 371. 
17 Ibid. 
18 EDGAR GOLD, GARD HANDBOOK ON MARINE POLLUTION, 2nd ed., 293 (Arendal: Gard, 
1998). 
19 Ibid. 
20 H. Pickering, A New Era for the Offshore Oil and Gas Industry on the UKCS, 23 MARINE POLICY 
329, 338 (1999). 
21 Ibid. at 377. 
The decommissioning and dumping of offshore installations also raise environmental 
concerns. Disposal options include leaving them in place; finding alternative uses for 
them; moving them to shore for recycling or using them to create artificial reefs.22 
Dumping the structures in the sea or leaving them in place “is hazardous to the 
environment because of the potential pollution from the accumulation of contaminated 
drill cuttings at the base of the platforms or from the materials and substances on 
board.”23 
From the foregoing, it is clear that pollution damage from offshore operations is real and 
cannot be over-emphasized. We will now turn our attention to civil liability for pollution 
damage under customary international law. 
 
Part II – International Custom 
According to article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, the sources 
of international law include “international custom, as evidenced of a general practice 
accepted as law.” It has been expressed that “the identification of customary law always 
has been, and remains, particularly problematical, requiring the exercise of skill, 
judgment, and considerable research.”24 
However, with respect to civil liability for pollution damage it may safely be said that at 
customary law, the rule is sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas – one must use his own so 
 
22 ESMAEILI, OFFSHORE OIL RIGS, supra note 2 at 192-195. 
23 Ibid. at 193. 
24 P.W. BIRNIE AND A.E. BOYLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT 15 (Oxford 
and New York: Clarendon Press and Oxford University Press, 1992). 
as not to damage that of another. This rule finds its reason in common sense. Its 
international law origin appears to be the Trail Smelter Arbitration25 where it was held 
that “no State has the right to use or permit the use of its territory in such a manner as to 
cause injury…in or to the territory of another or the properties of the persons therein.” 
Similar conclusions were reached in the later decisions in the Corfu Channel,26 Lake 
Lanoux27 and Nuclear Tests cases.28 
Although the cases cited do not directly address pollution damage resulting from offshore 
operations, their reasoning can be reasonably stretched to cover such activities since they 
establish the general principle of state responsibility for transboundary pollution. This is 
so as long as states retain jurisdiction over offshore operations in their coastal waters. The 
general principle may also be extended to “apply to incidents which arise outside the 
territory of the defendant state, but where the wrongdoer is nonetheless subject to the 
defendant state’s jurisdiction.”29 
It is also instructive to recall the admonishing of the United Nations Conference on the 
Human Environment (UNCHE).30 While recognizing the sovereign right of states to 
exploit their natural resources, Principle 21 of UNCHE enjoins states to ensure that 
activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of 
 
25 Trail Smelter Arbitration (United States v. Canada), (1931-1941), 3 R.I.A.A. 1905. 
26 Corfu Channel Case (United Kingdom v. Albania) I.C.J. Reports 1949, p.4 at p.22. 
27 Lake Lanoux Arbitration (France v. Spain), (1957) 12 R.I.A.A. 281. 
28 Nuclear Tests Cases (Australia v. France) (New Zealand v. France). See also the ILC Draft Articles on 
State Responsibility – International Law Commission, Draft Articles on International Liability for Injurious 
Consequences Arising out of Acts Not Prohibited by International Law (Prevention of Transboundary 
Harm from Hazardous Activities), Report of the International Law Commission, GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. 
No. 10, U.N. Doc A/56/10, chp. V.E.I.  
29 Barney T. Levantino, Protection of the High Seas from Operational Oil Pollution: A Proposal, 6
FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 72, 92 (1982). 
30 United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, (5-16 June 1972), 11 I.L.M. 1416. 
other states or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. More importantly, 
Principle 22 of UNCHE calls on states to cooperate for the development of liability and 
compensation regimes for victims of pollution and other environmental damage caused 
by activities within their jurisdiction or control of such states to areas beyond their 
jurisdiction. 
 
We may also call into play the recent Rio Declaration.31 Principles 2 and 13 stress 
Principles 21 and 22 of UNCHE respectively. Principle 16 then goes on to underline the 
polluter-pays principle which requires that the cost of pollution is to be borne by the 
polluter “with due regard to the public interest and without distorting international trade 
and investment.” 
 
Closely related to and based upon the sic utere tuo doctrine is the principle of good 
neighbourliness. Article 74 of the UN Charter provides that: 
Members of the United Nations also agree in their policy in respect of the 
territories to which this Chapter applies, no less than in respect of their 
metropolitan areas, must be based on the general principle of good 
neighbourliness, due account being taken of the interests and well-being of 
the rest of the world, in social, economic, and commercial matters. 
 
Although this section applies to non-governing territories, the principle expressed therein 
is germane to our purpose. Indeed, a good neighbour is the one who does not injure his 
neighbour through the activities under his control. Any contrary view would be an 
invitation to international lawlessness and against the principle of abuse of right.32 
31 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, (June 1992), 31 I.L.M. 874. 
32 See Article 300 of the LOSC. 
Notwithstanding these identifiable principles under customary international law, they are 
deliberative and merely declaratory of general principles recognizing civil liability for 
pollution. The principles set no standards and procedures for determining the limits of 
liability. In particular, the sic utere tuo doctrine “is too uncertain to provide a precise 
obligation upon states to prevent marine pollution … because it lacks any indication with 
respect to compensation for environmental damage.”33 We will next examine the 
international treaty law position. 
 
Part III – Global Conventions 
a) The Regime 
The sic utere tuo and good neighbourliness principles have found express recognition 
under international treaty law. Almost every international environmental law instrument 
incorporates these principles in their provisions. The following is an examination of the 
relevant global treaties. 
 
i) The 1958 Geneva Conventions 
The first United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea sought to establish a global 
regulatory regime for the marine environment with modest success. The conference 
adopted four conventions. However, only two of the conventions are relevant here.34 The 
Continental Shelf Convention vests in the coastal state sovereign rights over the 
 
33 ESMAEILI, OFFSHORE OIL RIGS, supra note 2 at 151.  
34 These are Convention on the Continental Shelf, 29 April 1958, 449 U.N.T.S. 311 [hereafter cited as the 
Continental Shelf Convention]; and the Convention on the High Seas, 29 April 1958, 559 U.N.T.S. 285 
[hereafter cited as the High Seas Convention]. 
continental shelf for the purpose of exploration and exploitation of its resources,35 
including the right to construct and maintain or operate installations necessary for such 
purpose.36 However, such activities must not unjustifiably interfere with navigation, 
fishing or the conservation of the living resources of the sea.37 In addition, disused or 
abandoned installations must be entirely removed.38 Beyond these provisions, no attempt 
whatsoever is made to address the question of liability for pollution damage. 
 
The High Seas Convention urges states to cooperate to draw regulations and measures to 
prevent pollution on the high seas. The closest this convention comes to the issue of 
liability for pollution damage is Article 28, which mandates states to take necessary 
legislative measures to ensure that owners of a pipeline beneath the high seas bear the 
cost of the destruction of other pipelines. 
 
ii) LOSC 
The LOSC, which supersedes the 1958 Conventions, seeks to settle all issues relating to 
the law of the sea. A general obligation is placed upon states to protect and preserve the 
environment in relation to offshore operations in line with the sic utere tuo principle.39 
The preventive obligations are carried further by urging states to cooperate on a global 
basis and, as appropriate, on a regional basis for the protection and preservation of the 
marine environment generally and in particular with respect to offshore operations.40 
35 Article 2(1). 
36 Article 5(2). 
37 Article 5(1). 
38 Article 5(5). 
39 Articles 192, 193, 194, and 195. 
40 Articles 197 and 208. 
On the seabed and ocean floor beyond the limits of national jurisdiction, states have the 
responsibility to ensure that activities therein are carried out in conformity with the 
provisions of the LOSC.41 Damage caused by default of responsibility entails liability. 
However, a state is not liable for damage caused by a person it has sponsored if the state 
in question has taken all necessary and appropriate measures to secure effective 
compliance.42 
Annex III of the LOSC also contains detailed rules on the basic conditions of 
prospecting, exploration and exploitation of the ocean floor and seabed beyond the limits 
of national jurisdiction. Article 22 of Annex III in particular holds a contractor liable for 
any damage arising from a wrongful act in the conduct of its operations. The extent of 
liability is stated to be the actual amount of damage. 
 
iii) Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response Convention (OPRC)43 
As the name suggests, the OPRC is designed to rally states to prepare for and effectively 
respond to oil pollution incidents. It is largely geared toward the establishment of 
efficient global and regional reporting systems to arrest in time the deleterious effects of 
oil pollution whenever and wherever they occur. It, therefore, mandates states to require 
operators of offshore units under their jurisdiction to have oil pollution emergency 
plans.44 
41 Articles 139(1) and 145. 
42 Article 139(2). 
43 International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Cooperation, (30 November 
1990), 30 I.L.M 733. 
44 Article 3(3). 
The OPRC has been hailed as the most efficient global instrument on the subject of 
pollution from offshore oilrigs.45 However, despite the fact that it calls for the application 
of the polluter pays principle in its preamble, it contains no provision on the issue of 
liability for pollution damage. 
 
iv) London Dumping Convention46 
We have noted that the decommissioning and disposal of oilrigs raises environmental 
concerns. The contracting parties of the London Dumping Convention pledge themselves 
to promote measures to protect the marine environment against pollution caused, inter 
alia, by hydrocarbons, including wastes from offshore operations.47 The issue of civil 
liability for pollution damage is dealt with, so to say, under article 10, which states that: 
In accordance with the principles of international law regarding State 
responsibility for damage to the environment of the other States or to any 
other area of the environment, caused by dumping wastes and other matter 
of all kinds, the Contracting Parties undertake to develop procedures for 
the assessment of liability and the settlement of disputes regarding 
dumping. 
 
b) Evaluation of the Global Conventions 
The state of international global treaty law on civil liability for pollution damage from 
offshore operations leaves much to be desired. There is a tendency in the treaties 
discussed to ignore the issue. Where an attempt is made to address the issue it is dealt 
with in a deliberative and side-wind fashion. What one finds are countless exhortations to 
states to take preventive measures against pollution. Liability and compensation issues 
 
45 ESMAEILI, OFFSHORE OIL RIGS, supra note 2 at 158. 
46 Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter, (29 
December 1972). 
47 Article 12 (a), (c) and (f). 
are relegated to the background for future consideration, perhaps awaiting the occurrence 
of a major catastrophe before action is taken to contain the effects. The current situation 
is too reminiscent of the painful fact that international law is always a step behind reality.   
 
The LOSC in particular is a major disappointment in view of the lukewarm manner with 
which it tackles the issue. Even under Annex III where pollution damage is stated to 
attract liability for offshore contractors on the high seas, the scope and extent of liability 
is not defined. This will be a perfect recipe for dispute and disagreement.  
 
A common theme, which runs through the global conventions, is admonishing of states to 
cooperate to adopt regional instruments to address the issue. This factor, coupled with the 
recognition in the conventions that national laws are not to be less effective in preventing, 
reducing and controlling pollution, have given credence to the continued proliferation of 
regional agreements to which we now turn our attention.     
 
Part IV – Regional Agreements  
i) The Persian Gulf 
The sea area shared by Bahrain, Iran, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United 
Arab Emirates represents the Persian Gulf, which supplies almost 60 per cent of the oil 
required by industrial nations.48 
The Kuwait Regional Convention49 and its three protocols50 regulate activities in this 
area. Apart from general obligations to prevent marine pollution, the convention places a 
 
48 ESMAEILI, OFFSHORE OIL RIGS, supra note 2 at 164. 
specific duty on the parties to take all appropriate measures to “prevent, abate, and 
combat pollution…resulting from exploration and exploitation of the bed of the territorial 
sea and its sub-soil and continental shelf...”51 The parties then undertake to co-operate to 
formulate appropriate rules and procedures for the determination of civil liability and 
compensation schemes for damage resulting from pollution of the marine environment.52 
The Kuwait Exploration Protocol follows the mother convention in imposing obligations 
for marine pollution prevention. Regrettably, it is dead silent on the issue of liability for 
pollution damage. 
 
ii) The Mediterranean Sea 
The 1976 Barcelona Convention is the framework agreement governing the 
Mediterranean Sea, which borders 21 states and 3 continents. The parties to the 
convention are obliged to combat pollution resulting from offshore operations.53 The 
parties also pledge to “cooperate as soon as possible in the formulation and adoption of 
appropriate procedures for the determination of liability and compensation for damage 
resulting from the pollution of the marine environment.”54 
49 Kuwait Regional Convention for Co-operation on the Protection of the Marine Environment from 
Pollution, 1978, Int’l Envt. Rep’r p.21: 2721. 
50 The relevant one is Protocol Concerning Marine Pollution from Exploitation of the Continental Shelf, 29 
March [Hereafter referred to as the Kuwait Exploration Protocol]. 
51 Article 7. 
52 Article 13. 
53 Article 7. 
54 Article 12. 
The Mediterranean Exploration Protocol is also relevant here.55 Offshore activities in the 
coverage area are subject to prior written authorization from the concerned authority.56 
The protocol requires state parties to impose a general obligation upon operators of 
offshore installations to use the best available, environmentally effective and 
economically appropriate techniques while observing internationally accepted standards 
regarding wastes, well use, storage and discharge of harmful or noxious substances.57 An 
operator is also obliged to remove any installation that is abandoned or disused.58 
Sanctions are to be imposed for illegal disposal of wastes and harmful or noxious 
substances59 and for breach of obligations by operators.60 
Article 27 of the Mediterranean Exploration Protocol is very instructive. Under this 
provision, the parties undertake to cooperate as soon as possible to formulate and adopt 
appropriate rules and procedures for determining liability and compensation schemes for 
offshore pollution damage. In the interim, however, the parties are required to impose 
liability and compensation schemes upon operators. The guiding principle here is that the 
compensation to be paid must be prompt and adequate. 
 
iii) The Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden 
Holding some of the world’s largest oil and gas reserves and bordered by Djibouti, Egypt, 
Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, and Yemen, the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden area is 
 
55 Protocol for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea against Pollution Resulting from Exploration and 
Exploitation of the Continental Shelf and the Seabed and its Subsoil, 1994. 
56 Article 4. 
57 Article 8. 
58 Article 20. 
59 Article 13. 
60 Article 7. 
governed by the 1982 Jeddah Convention.61 This convention is not too different from the 
previously discussed conventions. It only urges the parties to cooperate in the formulation 
of civil liability and compensation rules and procedures for pollution damage.62 
Moreover, its relevant protocol63 contains no provision of substance on the question of 
liability. 
 
iv) The Nordic Area 
Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden adopted the Environmental Protection 
Convention64 to guard against environmentally harmful activities. Such activities are 
defined to include the discharge from installations of solid or liquid waste and gas into 
the sea and the use of such installations in a manner that entails pollution of same.  The 
convention is made applicable to the continental shelves of the parties.  
 
A person who has suffered pollution damage from environmentally harmful activities has 
a right of audience before the courts or the administrative authority of the state under 
whose jurisdiction the activities were carried out.65 The forum for redress is mandated to 
determine issues of compensation for damage.66 “The question of compensation shall not 
be judged by rules which are less favourable to the injured party than the rules of 
compensation of the State in which the activities are being carried out.”67 The 
 
61 Regional Convention for the Conservation of the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden Environment, Jeddah, 1982. 
62 Article 13. 
63 Protocol concerning Regional Co-operation in Combating Pollution by Oil in Cases of Emergency, 
Jeddah, 14 February 1982. 
64 Nordic Environmental Protection Convention, Stockholm, 19 February 1974. 
65 Article 3. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Ibid. 
supervisory authority of a state party also has the right to institute proceedings in another 
contracting state for the purpose of guarding its interests.68 
v) The Baltic Sea 
The 1992 Helsinki Convention,69 which entered into force on 17 January 2000, replaces 
the 1974 Convention bearing the same name. The 1992 Convention seeks to assure the 
ecological restoration of the Baltic Sea by ensuring the possibility of self-regeneration of 
the marine environment.70 States are urged to preserve the marine environment by 
application of the precautionary principle to prevent pollution from offshore operations.71 
On the question of liability for pollution damage, the parties are simply obliged to apply 
the polluter-pays principle72 and to jointly develop rules concerning damage resulting 
from acts or omissions in contravention of the convention.73 Such rules must incorporate 
limits of responsibility, criteria and procedures for the determination of liability and 
available remedies.74 
vi) West and Central Africa 
From Mauritania running through the west coast of Africa down to Namibia, and 
splashing the shores of the oil powerhouse of Nigeria, the West and Central African 
 
68 Article 4. 
69 Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea, Helsinki, 1992. 
70 Ibid. Preamble. 
71 Articles 3 and 12. 
72 Article 3(4). 
73 Article 25. 
74 Ibid. 
Marine Region is governed by the Abidjan Convention75 and its Emergency Protocol.76 
Noting that existing conventions concerning the marine environment do not address 
extensively issues under its coverage, the Abidjan Convention imposes a duty on its 
parties to take appropriate measures to preserve the marine environment.77 The parties 
undertake to co-operate in the formulation and adoption of appropriate rules on the issue 
of liability for pollution damage. The Emergency Protocol contains no helpful provisions 
for our purpose. 
 
vii) East African Region 
Spanning the marine area from Southern Somalia to Northern South Africa, the East 
African Region is governed by the Nairobi Convention78 and its two Protocols.79 Set 
along the lines of the Abidjan Convention, the Nairobi Convention imposes a general 
obligation upon the parties to prevent pollution from seabed activities and to cooperate 
for the formulation of pollution damage liability principles in accordance with 
international law principles. None of the Nairobi Protocols contains any provision of 
substance with respect to liability. 
 
75 Convention for Co-operation in the Protection and Development of the Marine and Coastal Environment 
of West and Central Africa Region, Abidjan, 23 March 1981 
76 Protocol concerning Co-operation in Combating Pollution in Cases of Emergency, Abidjan, 23 March 
1981.  
77 Article 4. 
78 Convention for the Protection, Management and Development of the Marine and Coastal Environment of 
the Eastern African Region, Nairobi, 21 June 1985. 
79 Protocol concerning Co-operation in Combating Marine Pollution in Cases of Emergency in the Eastern 
African Region, Nairobi, 21 June 1985; Protocol concerning Protected Areas and Wild Fauna and Flora in 
the Eastern Africa Region, 21 June 1985. 
viii) The Wider Caribbean Region 
This region encompasses all the insular and coastal states and territories bordering the 
Caribbean Sea, including Belize and the Gulf of Mexico to Guyana. It is governed by the 
Cartagena de Indias Convention80 and its Oil Spills Protocol.81 While the Protocol 
focuses on emergency response to catastrophic oil spills and contains nothing on liability 
for damage caused by such spills, the Convention merely admonishes the parties to 
cooperate for the formulation of liability rules.      
 
ix) South Pacific 
The Island dominated South Pacific is governed by the Noumea Convention82 and its 
Protocols.83 The comments on the Cartegena de Indias agreements concerning the Wider 
Caribbean area apply to the Noumea treaties.  
 
x) South-East Pacific 
Spanning the entire length of the Pacific coast of South America from Panama to Cape 
Horn, the South Pacific Marine Region is governed by the Lima Convention together 
with five protocols and two more protocols in the offing.84 It should be pointed out that 
none of the protocols provides any rules on civil liability for pollution damage. Aside 
 
80 Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Wider Caribbean Region, (24 March 
1983), Int’l Env’tal Rep’r p. 21:3201.  
81 Protocol concerning Cooperation in Combating Oil Spills in the Wider Caribbean Region, (24 March 
1983), Int’l Env’tal Rep’r p. 21:3261. 
82 Convention for the Protection of the Natural Resources of the South Pacific Region, (24 November 
1986), Int’l Env’tal Rep’r p.21:3171. 
83 Protocol for the Prevention of Pollution of the South Pacific Region by Dumping, Noumea, 25 November 
1986; Protocol concerning Co-operation in Combating Pollution Emergencies in the South Pacific Region, 
Noumea, 25 November 1986. 
84 Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment and the Coastal Area of the South-East Pacific, 
Lima, 12 November 1981. 
from the usual obligations to prevent pollution of the marine environment and 
exhortations to adopt rules on the issue of pollution civil liability, the Lima Convention 
obliges the parties to “ensure that recourse is available in accordance with their legal 
systems for compensation or other relief in respect of damage caused.85 
xi) North-East Pacific 
Lying to the west of Columbia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, 
Nicaragua and Panama, the North-East Pacific region is governed by the recent Antigua 
Convention.86 It imposes the usual general obligations for pollution prevention on the 
basis of the precautionary principle. It also calls for the application of the polluter- pays 
principle by “virtue of which those responsible for pollution should pay the full costs of 
measures to prevent, control, reduce and remedy such pollution, with due regard for the 
public interest.”87 The adoption of liability and compensation rules on pollution damage 
is postponed to be dealt with in a future protocol.88 
xi) The Black Sea 
Lodged between southeastern Europe and Asia Minor and connected to the 
Mediterranean Sea by the Bosporus and the Sea of Marmara, and to the Sea of Azov by 
the Strait of Kerch, the Black Sea is governed by the Bucharest Convention89and its two 
 
85 Article 11(2). 
86 Convention for Cooperation in the Protection and Sustainable Development of the Marine and Coastal 
Environment of the Northeast Pacific, Antigua, 18 February 2002. 
87 Article 5(6)(b). 
88 Article 13. 
89 Convention for the Cooperation in the Protection of the Black Sea against Pollution, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 
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protocols.90 The convention obliges each party to adopt rules and regulations on liability 
for pollution damage from offshore operations,91 with the aim of ensuring the highest 
degree of deterrence and protection of the Black Sea.92 The compensation payable should 
be prompt and adequate with recourse for redress in accordance with the legal systems of 
the parties.93 No useful purpose will be served by discussing the two Bucharest Protocols 
since they contain nothing on civil liability for pollution damage resulting from offshore 
operations.  
 
xii) North-East Atlantic 
The 1992 OSPAR Convention94 governs the North-East Atlantic as it replaces the 1972 
Oslo Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping from Ships and the 
1974 Paris Convention on the prevention of Marine Pollution from Land Based Sources. 
The OSPAR Convention contains comprehensive provisions on the prevention of 
pollution from offshore activities.95 On the issue of liability, Article 2(2)(b) requires the 
application, without more, of the “polluter pays principle, by virtue of which the costs of 
pollution prevention, control and reduction measures are to be borne by the polluter.” 
 
90 Protocol on Protection of the Black Sea Marine Environment against Pollution from Land Based Sources, 
Bucharest, 1992; Protocol on Cooperation in Combating Pollution of the Black Sea Marine Environment by 
Oil and Other Harmful Substances in Emergency Situations, Bucharest, 1992. 
91 Article 16(2). 
92 Article 16(4). 
93 Article 16(3). 
94 Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic, (22 September 
1992), 32 I.L.M. 1069. 
95 Annex III. 
xiii) The North Sea 
The North Sea contains Western Europe’s largest oil and natural gas reserves.96 The 
1983 Bonn Agreement97, which governs this area, is dedicated to preventing grave and 
imminent danger to coastal areas by oil spills and other harmful substances. It merely 
stresses that its provisions do not prejudice the rights of a party of being reimbursed for 
costs of action dealing with pollution or the threat of pollution. 
 
However, seven years prior to the adoption of the Bonn Agreement, Belgium, Denmark, 
France, the former West Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the 
United Kingdom adopted the London Civil Liability Convention (LCLC).98 This 
convention applies exclusively to pollution damage resulting from an incident occurring 
beyond the coastal low-water line at an installation under the jurisdiction of a Controlling 
State,99 and suffered in the territory of and areas within which a State Party exercises 
sovereign rights over natural resources. 
 
The LCLC establishes a strict liability regime under which operators of an installation are 
jointly and severally liable for any pollution damage resulting from an incident.100 
However, no liability arises where it is established that the damage resulted from an act 
of war, hostilities, civil war, insurrection, an act or omission done with intent to cause 
 
9696 Country Analysis Brief: North Sea, online: EIA <http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/northsea.html>
97 Agreement for Co-operation in Dealing with Pollution of the North Sea by Oil and other Harmful 
Substances. 
98 Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage Resulting from Exploration for and Exploitation 
of Seabed Mineral Resources, (16 May 1977), 16 I.L.M. 1451. 
99 Defined as a State Party which exercises sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring the resources of 
the seabed and its subsoil in the area in or above which the installation is situated – Article 1(4). 
100 Article 3. 
damage by the person suffering the damage, or a natural phenomenon of an exceptional, 
inevitable and irresistible character.101 
An offshore installation operator is entitled to limit his liability for each installation and 
each incident to the reviewable amount of 30m Special Drawing Rights.102 However, he 
is not entitled to limit his liability if it is proved that the damage occurred because of an 
act or omission by the operator, done deliberately with the actual knowledge that 
pollution would result.103 
A claim for compensation for pollution damage may be brought against the operator or 
directly against his insurer104 but only in the courts of the State party where the damage 
was suffered.105 Compensation rights are effectively extinguished four years after a 
cause of action arises.106 A recognized judgment is enforceable in each state party as soon 
as formalities required in that state have been complied with.107 Finally, a state is not 
prevented from providing for unlimited liability or a higher limit than what is specified 
under the convention.108 
101 Ibid. 
102 Articles 6. Special Drawing Rights has the meaning as defined by the International Monetary Fund and 
used for its own operations and transactions – Article 1(9).  
103 Ibid. 
104 Article 8. 
105 Article 11. 
106 Article 10.t  
107 Article 12. 
108 Article 15. 
xiv) United States / Mexico Marine Pollution Agreement109 
This agreement was brokered following the Ixtoc I offshore well blowout off the Bay of 
Campeche on 3 June 1980. It calls for preventive measures aimed at eliminating the 
threat of marine pollution by petroleum in all its forms. The agreement contains no 
concrete provisions on civil liability for such pollution. 
xv) Offshore Pollution Liability Agreement (OPOL)110 
OPOL is not an agreement between states. It is a contract among operators of, and those 
who intend to become operators of, offshore facilities used in connection with 
exploration for or production of oil and the exploration of or appraisal of gas.111 It is 
intended to provide an orderly means for compensation and reimbursing any person who 
incurs costs for taking remedial measures as a result of a discharge of oil from an 
offshore facility. It should be noted that the agreement is not applicable to abandoned 
wells, installations or pipelines.112 
OPOL establishes a strict liability regime under which a person who has sustained 
damage or taken remedial measures against the polluting effects of the offshore 
operations of a party is entitled to be compensated or reimbursed, up to a maximum limit 
 
109 Agreement of Cooperation between the United States of America and the United Mexican States 
Regarding Pollution of the Marine Environment by Discharges of Hydrocarbons and other Hazardous 
Substances, (24 July 1980), 20 I.L.M. 696.  
110 1974 as amended on 1 August 1986. 
111 The original members are Amoco (UK) Exploration Co., Burmah Oil (North Sea) Ltd., BP Petroleum 
Development Ltd., Total Oil Marine Ltd., Conoco North Sea Inc., Esso Exploration and Production U.K. 
Inc., Gulf Oil Production Co., Hamilton Brothers Oil Co. (GB) Ltd., Mobil North Sea Ltd., Shell U.K. Ltd., 
Phillips Petroleum Co., Signal Oil and Gas Co. Ltd., Siebens Oil and Gas (U.K.) Ltd., Texaco North Sea 
Sun Oil Co. Ltd., and Cluff Oil Ltd. 
112 Clause I (10)c 
of $120,000,000 per incident, subject to some provisos.113 Defenses similar to those 
under the LCLC are available to an operator.114 A cause of action extinguishes one year 
from the time it arose.115 A cause of action is to be submitted to arbitration in London in 
line with the rules of the International Chamber of Commerce.116 This forum is exclusive 
for disposing of such disputes.117 
Evaluation of the Regional Agreements 
The dreary descriptive analysis of the various regional and other agreements was 
intended to reveal the unconvincing and highly unsatisfactory state of civil liability 
regime for pollution damage resulting from offshore operations. A charitable observation 
is that the world community appears to find solace and virtue in inaction where action is 
gravely needed. The trend so far has been to stall and wait for the occurrence of an 
incident of immense catastrophic proportions, by which time the remedial measures may 
be rendered nugatory. 
 
It is disturbing that most of the regional arrangements do not deal directly with the issue 
of civil liability and compensation for pollution damage. The sad practice has been 
merely high sounding admonishing of states to take future action to develop liability rules 
– a future which never appears to arrive and perhaps may never arrive – “tomorrow is 
another day, in the immortal words of the cinematic star.”118 
113 Clause IV (A). 
114 Clause IV (B). 
115 Clause VI. 
116 Clause IX. 
117 Ibid. 
118 GAVOUNELI, POLLUTION, supra note 10 at 149. 
Even where an attempt is made to address the issue of liability directly, the principles are 
generally and painfully captured in the hallowed words – “the parties shall apply the 
polluter-pays principle” – and nothing more. A few of the agreements, including the 
Nordic, Bucharest and Lima Conventions, deserve particular commendation, though not 
too highly, for the attempt made therein to go beyond the mere future aspirations. The 
LCLC is undoubtedly the most important and comprehensive international agreement on 
civil liability for pollution damage resulting from offshore operations. However, it is not 
in force and like the other regional agreements, it lacks global application. 
 
OPOL is also hugely commendable for its definitive and determinate provisions. 
However, it is a private contract that cannot “fully compensate for the lack of a 
comprehensive, worldwide, legally binding document that would address the issues of 
pollution from offshore installations and compensation for damage caused by it in a 
global perspective.”119 
It should also be noted that the absence of a global convention on the issue of civil 
liability for pollution damage resulting from offshore operations, coupled with the fact 
the regional agreements apply to areas within the jurisdiction of state parties, means that 
no liability regime applies to the high seas and other areas beyond the limits of national 
jurisdiction. In the next part, we will attempt to ascertain whether the liability rules 
regulating the shipping industry may be assimilated to apply to offshore installations.  
 
119 Ibid. at 120. 
Part V – Offshore Oil Rigs as Ships 
We have noted that unlike the case with offshore installations, civil liability for ship 
source pollution damage is well defined in global conventions.120 The shipping 
conventions are designed to ensure the payment of adequate compensation to sufferers of 
pollution damage. The regime endangers certainty for both the industry and claimants. 
 
In the absence of a global civil liability convention regulating offshore activities, it may 
be worthwhile to ascertain whether offshore installations qualify as ships under the 
shipping conventions so as to assimilate those rules to apply to them. The analogy is 
often drawn between oilrigs and ships in the oil and gas industry for the reason that: 
There are several basic (and conceptually important) similarities between 
transnational injury caused by a tanker spill and transnational injury 
caused by an offshore drilling platform blowout. First, both situations 
present the prospect of extensive liability to the individual or entity found 
to be responsible for the underlying activity. Second, both of the 
underlying activities are extremely valuable to the international 
community; and that community has a strong economic interest in 
promoting those activities. Finally, it would be impossible through the 
exercise of due care to totally eliminate the risks of harm inherent in those 
activities.121 
i) Types of Offshore Oil Rigs 
It is prudent to consider the different types of rigs for offshore operations before we go 
into the definitions. Offshore oilrigs may be classified into mobile units and fixed 
platforms. The first category rigs are generally classified as floating and bottom-
 
120 These include, International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution, 1969, 9 I.L.M. 45 to be 
replaced by its 1992 Protocol; International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for 
Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, 1971, 11 I.L.M. 284 and its protocols; International Convention 
on Civil Liability for Bunker Oil Pollution Damage, 2001. 
121 William N. Hancock and Robert M. Stone, Liability for Transnational Pollution Caused by Offshore Oil 
Rig Blowouts, 5 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. Rev. 377, 384-5 (1982). 
supported.122 Floating rigs include drill ships,123 semi-submersibles124 and barges.125 
Bottom-supported rigs include submersibles126 and jack-up drills.127 Fixed platforms on 
the other hand, are similar to onshore oilrigs though they possess more elaborate 
features.128 Any assimilation of rules from the shipping industry must take the differences 
into consideration. 
 
ii) The Definitions 
The definition of ship in international law is function and object specific. Hence, no 
standard definition exists. The 1969 Civil Liability Convention129 defines ship in article 1 
as “any sea-going vessel and any seaborne craft of any type whatsoever, actually carrying 
oil in bulk as cargo”. It appears that this definition does not apply to oilrigs because even 
the mobile rigs are not designed to carry oil in bulk as cargo.130 
The definition of ship under the 1971 Fund Convention131 is the same as that of the 1969 
Civil Liability Convention. The 1992 Protocol to amend the 1969 Convention is even  
 
122 ESMAEILI, OFFSHORE OIL RIGS, supra note 2 at 12. 
123 Drill ships look like ships but have a derrick on top which drills through a hole in the hull. They are 
either anchored or positioned with computer-controlled propellers along the hull which continually correct 
the ship’s drift – source: Industry Information: Petroleum Topic Fact Sheet, online: Australian Institute of 
Petroleum <http:www.aip.com.au/industry/fact_offshore.htm#top> [AIP].  
124 Semi-submersibles are mobile structures, some with their own locomotion. Their superstructures are 
supported by columns sitting on hulls or pontoons which are ballasted below the water surface – source: 
AIP, ibid. 
125 A drilling barge “resembles a barge rather than a ship and is usually box shaped or semi-shaped.” – 
ESMAEILI, OFFSHORE OIL RIGS, supra note 2 at 16. 
126 Submersibles are for drilling in shallow waters where they are floated and ballasted to sit on the seabed 
– source: AIP, supra note 123. 
127 Jack-up drilling units are self elevating. Their legs are lowered to the seabed and the hull is jacked-up 
clear of the sea surface – source AIP, ibid. 
128 ESMAEILI, OFFSHORE OIL RIGS, supra note 2 at 16. 
129 Supra note 120. 
130 ESMAEILI, OFFSHORE OIL RIGS, supra note 2 at 33. 
131 Supra note 120. 
more definite on excluding oilrigs from its purview. Article 1 defines a ship as: 
…any sea-going vessel and seaborne craft of any type whatsoever 
constructed or adapted for the carriage of oil in bulk as cargo, provided 
that a ship capable of carrying oil and other cargoes shall be regarded as a 
ship only when it is actually carrying oil in bulk as cargo and during any 
voyage following such carriage unless it is proved that it has no residues 
of such carriage of oil in bulk aboard. 
 
It appears that the 2001 Bunker Convention provides a leeway.132 Article 1 defines a ship 
widely as “any seagoing vessel and seaborne craft of any type whatsoever.” Mobile 
offshore units may fall within this definition hence enabling the application of the 
liability rules under the convention to be applicable to them. Article 2 makes the Bunker 
Convention apply exclusively to pollution damage caused in the territorial seas and 
exclusive economic zones of party states. Therefore, it is inapplicable to areas beyond the 
limits of national jurisdiction. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
We have pointed out that there is a distinct absence of a global instrument on civil 
liability for pollution damage arising from offshore operations. We have noted the 
adverse effects of pollution from such activities. We have examined the international 
customary and treaty law position on the issue. We have traversed various regional 
agreements with no avail. We just attempted, with little success to assimilate the civil 
liability regime of the shipping industry to offshore operations. The irresistible 
conclusion is that the present state of the civil liability regime for pollution damage from 
offshore operations typifies the doomsday adage – “between the Devil and the deep blue 
sea”.  
 
132 Supra note 120. 
A global instrument on the subject is badly needed. Such an arrangement must possess 
certain salient features, including making it applicable to all zones of the sea. Another 
feature should be an efficient enforcement mechanism defined by Reisman as “a 
purposive particularization of a public sanctioning system.”133 The absence of a potent 
enforcement mechanism would render the arrangement a mere declaration of intentions. 
Private individuals should also be given the right of audience before the system’s 
adjudicating forum. 
 
A very important feature should, off course, be the basis and extent of liability of the 
tortfeasor. From the authorities liability may be strict, absolute or based upon fault 
(negligence). Each type has its own pros and cons depending on whether the beholder is a 
claimant or a defendant. 
 
Liability is absolute where the defendant is afforded no defence whatsoever. The entirety 
of the loss falls on him without any due consideration of extenuating factors, which may 
diminish his responsibility for the damage caused. The defendant is liable for damage 
caused in relation to his operations even if the incident in question is attributable to an act 
or omission of a third party. This type of liability perhaps owes its origin to the common 
law tort doctrine of absolute liability beginning with the celebrated English case of 
Rylands v. Fletcher.134 
133 William M. Reisman, Sanctions and Enforcement in CYRILL E. BLACK AND RICHARD A. FALKS, 
EDS., THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER, vol 3, 300 (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1971). 
134 (1866) L.R. 1 Ex. 265; L.R. 3 H.L. 300. 
Liability based on negligence holds the defendant liable for only the damage resulting 
from an incident that is attributable to his lack of taking reasonable care to prevent the 
occurrence of the incident in question. Thus, he is exculpated from liability if he is able to 
show that he took all due care and yet the incident occurred because it defies the taking of 
utmost care. 
 
Strict liability is a moderation of absolute liability. It is a compromise between the 
considerations – “if the defendant has some dangerous thing under his control which 
subsequently causes damage why should a plaintiff have to prove negligence?”135 – and 
“is it equitable that the defendant should be liable for circumstances beyond his 
control?”136 Under this rubric, the defendant is made liable for damage resulting from 
and in relation to his industry. However, he is afforded defences like act of God, act of 
war, act of state, acts or omissions of a third party, and intentional acts of a claimant 
calculated to cause the harm complained of. 
 
It is submitted that a global treaty on civil liability for pollution damage arising from 
offshore operations should be based on strict liability principles. Absolute liability 
appears to be harsh and fault liability appears to be permissive in their application. It has 
been asserted that the “strict liability doctrine should be utilized in public international 
law because the concept is now accepted in nations throughout the world.”137 
Nevertheless, the question often raised on the basis of equity is that “it may be too severe 
 
135 C.W.M. Ingram, Oil Pollution – Rylands v. Fletcher, 121 NEW L.J. 183 (1971). 
136 Ibid. 
137 CHURCHILL AND LOWE, THE LAW OF THE SEA, supra note 3 at 702. 
a burden upon the industry to make it strictly liable without any limitation.”138 However, 
in the absence of negligence, leaving the loss where it fell would be unreasonable and 
unfair to the sufferer of such loss.139 Indeed: 
The creator of an abnormally great risk [should] be strictly liable because, 
between the creator and the innocent victim, the one who engages in the 
dangerous profit-making activity is best able to predict and allocate the 
risk of loss. The enterprise can spread the loss through slightly higher 
prices to consumers whereas an innocent victim cannot.140 
Technological advancement and the increase in demand for petroleum products will 
necessarily push upwards the incidence of offshore operations leading to an increase of 
the pollution risk such activities pose to the marine environment. A potent and aggressive 
civil liability regime should be established to cater for the unthinkable. A comprehensive 
treaty with global reach is the key. All other ground is sinking sand. 
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